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Abstract
This study examines the presence of ﬁnancial constraints in US agricultural
cooperatives. We test the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis with a panel
data econometric analysis of agricultural cooperatives’ investment behaviour.
Regression results suggest that agricultural cooperatives’ capital expenditures
are signiﬁcantly affected by the availability of internal funds. Results also indi-
cate that the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow is correlated with cooperative
structural characteristics.
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1. Introduction
Historically, agricultural cooperatives have played an important economic role in
providing market access and competitive returns to independent producers in the
US, Western Europe and other advanced agricultural countries. In recent years,
however, the restructuring of cooperatives through bankruptcies, liquidations and
conversions to corporations have increasingly made business media headlines. These
recent ‘cooperative failures’ have led some scholars to question the future viability of
the cooperative form of business. Many possible explanations for such failures have
been identiﬁed, including inertia in cooperative re-modelling (Nilsson, 1997), increas-
ing member heterogeneity and individualism (Fulton, 1995), collective decision-
making costs (Hansmann, 1996), and property rights constraints (Holmstrom, 1999).
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In particular, it has been suggested that ﬁnancial constraints are the ‘Achilles’
heel’ of cooperatives in an increasingly concentrated, tightly coordinated and cap-
ital-intensive food system (Vitaliano, 1983; Cook, 1995).2 According to the cooper-
ative ﬁnancial constraint hypothesis, agricultural cooperatives are unable to acquire
sufﬁcient risk capital to ﬁnance proﬁtable investment opportunities. As a result,
cooperatives may be insufﬁciently capitalised to make the necessary investments to
grow and remain a viable organisational form.
Financial constraints are largely related to the incentive system inherent in the
vaguely deﬁned property rights structure of cooperatives (Cook, 1995). First,
cooperative residual claims are restricted as only active producer-members may
provide the organisation with voting equity capital (Vitaliano, 1983). In other
words, risk capital acquisition in the traditional cooperative ﬁrm is limited by
the number, the wealth, and the risk-bearing capacity of its current members.
Second, cooperative members lack incentives to invest because of free rider, hori-
zon and portfolio constraints (Knoeber and Baumer, 1983; Cook and Iliopoulos,
2000). Consequently, traditional cooperatives rely primarily on patronage-based
methods for acquiring risk capital, that is, retained patronage refunds and per-
unit capital retains. In doing so, equity capital in a cooperative’s balance sheet
is allocated to individual members, representing a claim against the cooperative
by present and former members with retained patronage refunds. This claim is
redeemable, with the ultimate payments to members being at the discretion of
the cooperative board of directors. Because redeeming equity is a cash outlay to
the cooperative, a large portion of its equity capital stock is not considered per-
manent. Finally, cooperatives have limited access to outside sources of ﬁnance,
particularly public debt and equity markets, because of restrictions on residual
claims (Hart and Moore, 1996).
Although the theoretical arguments for the existence of ﬁnancial constraints in
cooperatives are persuasive, empirical studies have provided inconclusive evidence
for the cooperative ﬁnancial constraint hypothesis. In evaluating the cooperative
performance literature, we have found growth, ﬁnancial ratio and economic efﬁ-
ciency studies that inform the issue of ﬁnancial constraints. Growth studies have
found higher growth rates in cooperatives relative to corporations in the 1970s
(Chen et al., 1985) but have also concluded that the long-run growth rate of seven
large North American cooperatives is ‘low, perhaps even zero’ (Fulton et al., 1995).
Taken together, these two studies support Caves and Petersen’s (1986) assertion
that cooperatives are capable of high short-term growth rates that are not sustaina-
ble as a result of equity capital rotation, which reduces the amount of internal
ﬁnance for future investments.
In two separate empirical studies, Lerman and Parliament (1990, 1993) examine
the cooperative equity constraint hypothesis by comparing the capital structure of
2 It is important to note that a market characterised by increasing industry concentration,
vertical coordination and capital intensity assumes signiﬁcant market power, which is a major
economic reason (along with tax beneﬁts) for cooperative formation. But, at the same time,
these structural changes constitute external challenges to cooperatives, which coupled with
internal challenges, undermine their competitiveness and survival. Cook (1995) and Hans-
mann (1996) address these tradeoffs, whereas Chaddad and Cook (2004) discuss the cooper-
ative structures that have emerged as a response to these challenges.
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cooperatives with corporations. Cooperatives are viewed as ‘equity-bound’ and are
expected to be more leveraged than proprietary ﬁrms. Lerman and Parliament
(1990) show that median leverage ratios are not signiﬁcantly different for coopera-
tives and comparable corporations in food-processing industries. Subsequently, Ler-
man and Parliament (1993) study the ﬁnancing of asset growth in agricultural
cooperatives. Contrary to theoretical expectations, cooperative equity capital is not
statistically different from the national average of non-ﬁnancial corporations. But
as noted by Lerman and Parliament (1993, p. 439), ‘the observation of high equity
ﬁnancing proportions among the sample of cooperatives does not unambiguously
resolve the hypothesis of equity constraints in cooperatives’ because their study does
not account for the ﬁnancing needs of cooperatives or the demand for investment
funds.
Another strand of the cooperative performance literature focuses on economic
efﬁciency concepts. By estimating multi-product variable cost functions, Akridge
and Hertel (1992), Schroeder (1992) and Featherstone and Al-Kheraiji (1995) have
found evidence of excess capacity in agricultural supply and marketing cooperatives.
Using different methodological approaches, Sexton et al. (1989) and Caputo and
Lynch (1993) have also detected physical capital overinvestment in a sample of
cotton-ginning cooperatives. Evidence of overcapacity in cooperatives seems hard to
reconcile with the ﬁnancial constraint hypothesis at ﬁrst sight, but the evidence
might simply reﬂect the 1970s agricultural boom when cooperatives had ﬁnancial
capacity to grow by means of borrowed funds. In addition, overcapacity at some
point in time does not imply sufﬁcient capital for optimal adjustment and growth
over a longer time period.
The purpose of this study is to examine the presence of ﬁnancial constraints
in agricultural cooperatives. We test the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis
with a panel data econometric analysis of US agricultural cooperatives’ invest-
ment behaviour. Speciﬁcally, we examine whether agricultural cooperatives’
investment is constrained by the availability of internal funds by estimating
restricted and cash ﬂow-augmented investment models. Additionally, the study
examines whether cooperative structural and ﬁnancial management characteristics
affect the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow. These structural characteristics
include ﬁrm asset size, relative amount of permanent equity capital to net worth,
credit risk, and ﬁnancial leverage.
2. Theoretical Framework
The empirical analysis of the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis is based
on the Q theory of investment and its subsequent extensions including the effects
of informational imperfections and property rights constraints on ﬁrm investment
behaviour. The Q theory is derived from the ﬁrm’s dynamic proﬁt maximisa-
tion problem (for details regarding theory development and empirical applica-
tions, see Hubbard, 1998). Given the conditions assumed by the Q theory of
investment – in particular, that capital markets are frictionless – external and
internal sources of funds are perfect substitutes. As a result, ﬁnancial variables
play no role in capital spending. The Q theory, therefore, predicts that capital
spending only responds to marginal q – a measure of investment opportunities –
which is deﬁned as the expected discounted value of proﬁts from new capital
investment.
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Iit
Kit
¼ ai þ bqit þ sit þ eit : ð1Þ
Equation (1) is the Q theory speciﬁcation of the investment equation, where Iit denotes
investment (capital expenditures) for the ith ﬁrm at time t, Kit is beginning-of-period
capital stock, ai represents ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects, qit is marginal q, sit is the technology
shock and eit is an optimisation error. As marginal q is unobservable, Tobin’s average
q is commonly used as a proxy variable in empirical studies of business investment.
Tobin’s q, constructed from ﬁnancial market data, is an appropriate measure of mar-
ginal q only under certain conditions, including competitive product and factor mar-
kets, homogeneity of ﬁxed capital and linearly homogeneous production and
adjustment cost technologies (Hayashi, 1982). Notwithstanding these caveats, the
empirical speciﬁcation of the Q investment equation is commonly represented by:
Iit
Kit
¼ ai þ bQit þ sit þ eit ; ð2Þ
where Qit is the tax-adjusted value of Tobin’s q.
Introducing informational imperfections in capital markets extends the neoclassi-
cal Q theory of investment. Asymmetric information models ﬁnd that the presence
of information problems in capital markets results in a cost wedge between external
ﬁnance and internally generated funds. Consequently, the supply curve of ﬁnance is
a horizontal segment up to the ﬁrm’s total net worth but is upward-sloping beyond
that point as the ﬁrm seeks external funds to ﬁnance investment projects. In addi-
tion, these models posit that the slope of the supply curve of ﬁnance is proportional
to information costs between the ﬁrm and suppliers of external funds. In other
words, the pattern of investment sensitivity to internal funds varies systematically
across ﬁrms and should be higher for those ﬁrms with imperfect access to external
funds (Hubbard, 1998).
In addition to informational imperfections, cooperatives are hypothesised to face
ﬁnancial constraints because of the nature of their residual claims as mentioned in
the introductory section. Both arguments provide the theoretical underpinning for
including proxy variables for changes in net worth (e.g. cash ﬂow) in the standard
Q investment equation. Consequently, the restricted Q model of investment may be
expanded as follows:
Iit
Kit
¼ ai þ bQit þ cCFit þ sit þ eit ; ð3Þ
where CFit represents cash ﬂow. A positive and statistically signiﬁcant cash ﬂow
coefﬁcient in the investment equation is interpreted as evidence of ﬁnancial con-
straints.
On the basis of the empirical speciﬁcation laid out in equation (3), studies of cap-
ital market imperfections affecting investment behaviour utilise ﬁrm-level panel
data. Theory suggests that ﬁrms facing informational problems in capital markets
and internal property rights constraints are prone to experience binding ﬁnancial
constraints when making investment decisions. As a result, the difference between
the estimated cash ﬂow coefﬁcients across sub-samples provides a stronger evidence
of ﬁnancial constraints in the sample. For example, Fazzari et al. (1988) identify
‘high information cost’ manufacturing corporations on the basis of a priori infor-
mation on observed dividend payout policies. Speciﬁcally, low payouts (relative to
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earnings) signify high information costs. If the cost disadvantage of external ﬁnance
is large, it should have the greatest effect on ﬁrms that retain most of their income.
They estimate a Q investment equation with cash ﬂow as a proxy for changes in net
worth. Their empirical results indicate a substantially greater sensitivity of invest-
ment to cash ﬂow in ﬁrms classiﬁed a priori as ‘ﬁnancially constrained’.
Subsequently, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) propose an alternative proxy
variable, called fundamental q, to measure ﬁrm investment opportunities instead of
Tobin’s q. Instead of using market value data to measure investment demand, the
authors estimate a set of vector autoregression (VAR) forecasting equations based
on the ﬁrm’s fundamentals – i.e. proﬁts and sales – and use the estimates from the
VAR system to construct marginal q. Gilchrist and Himmelberg’s approach is rele-
vant because it allows the Q model of investment to be estimated for non-publicly
traded ﬁrms for which market data are not available. Subsequently, the fundamen-
tal q approach has been applied to the study of ﬁnancial constraints in the farm sec-
tor (Bierlen and Featherstone, 1998; Barry et al., 2000; Benjamin and Phimister,
2002). This paper utilises the fundamental q approach to examine the investment
behaviour of another set of privately held ﬁrms – agricultural cooperatives.
3. Econometric Model and Data
In this section we discuss the empirical model and data used to investigate the inter-
dependence of ﬁnancing and investment decisions in agricultural cooperatives. The
employed econometric model follows the Q theory of investment and speciﬁcally
the fundamental q approach of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995). The investment
equation is given by:
Iit
Kit
¼ gi þ mt þ bqit þ cCFit þ eit ; ð4Þ
where gi and mt are ﬁrm- and time-speciﬁc effects, qit is marginal q, CFit is cash ﬂow,
and eit is a random error. Under the condition of perfect capital access, cash ﬂow
has no inﬂuence on investment (b ¼ 0).
The marginal proﬁtability of capital (marginal q), a measure of investment
demand, is constructed from the estimates of a bivariate VAR system using a vector
of ﬁrm fundamentals (xit) that includes cash ﬂow (as the jth element), sales and
lagged values thereof:
xit ¼ Axit1 þ fi þ dt þ uit : ð5Þ
Note that the inclusion of lagged values in xit implies a VAR of higher order than
1. Fundamental q is then deﬁned by the projection of future proﬁts based on the
estimated coefﬁcients of the VAR, A, deﬁned as:
qit ¼ ½c0ðI kAÞ1xit ; ð6Þ
where c is a conformable vector of zeros with a 1 in the jth row, I is the identity
matrix, and k is a constant representing the sum of the discount factor and depreci-
ation rate. This allows substituting qit in equation (4) with the right-hand side of
equation (6).
Following Bierlen and Featherstone (1998), the modiﬁed investment equation (4)
and the VAR in equation (5) are estimated simultaneously using the generalised
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method of moments (GMM) estimator accommodating heteroskedastic errors and
endogeneity in the model. The instrument set includes lagged values of ﬁrm funda-
mentals such as cash ﬂow, sales, net worth, net income and depreciation. For esti-
mation purposes, all variables are ﬁrst-differenced in order to eliminate ﬁxed effects
(Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988).
Empirical testing of the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis is based on a
ﬁrm-level panel dataset of US agricultural cooperatives. The dataset was obtained
from CoBank, a ﬁnancial services organisation that collected and standardised the
ﬁnancial data for all ﬁrms included in the sample. This centralised approach ensures
accurate comparisons among cross-sectional units throughout the study period.
In addition, the cooperatives in the sample produce audited annual ﬁnancial
reports certiﬁed by an accounting ﬁrm and prepared under the generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP), which contributes to the quality and integrity of the
dataset.
The dataset contains incomplete annual accounting information from 1271 agri-
cultural cooperatives comprising the years 1991 to 2000. The sample includes local
farm supply and grain marketing cooperatives, processing cooperatives with opera-
tions in food manufacturing industries, agricultural production and service coopera-
tives, and cooperatives involved in wholesale trade activities. Firms with negative
equity and ﬁxed assets are excluded from the sample because they are ﬁnancially
troubled. It is a common practice in the empirical investment literature to exclude
from the sample ﬁrms with extreme values of investment, cash ﬂow, sales or other
variables of interest. The model can be sensitive to outliers, especially if ﬁrms have
very low capital stock, which is used to normalise the variables in the model. We
therefore apply outlier rules to the data and delete observations if they fall in the
1% tails of the respective variable’s distribution. Finally, we require that ﬁrms have
at least 7 years of available data for the variables of interest to be included in the
sample. The ﬁnal sample consists of 876 ﬁrms and 7293 observations.
The construction of the variables included in the empirical model of cooperative
investment behaviour is conducted as follows. Investment (Iit) is deﬁned as capital
expenditures for the construction and acquisition of physical assets (property, plant
and equipment). However, as data on agricultural cooperatives’ capital expenditures
are not available, investment is measured from changes in physical assets between
subsequent years. This study follows Hoshi et al. (1991) and measures cooperative
investment as the change in the stock of depreciable capital from the previous year
plus capital depreciation during the year.
Cash ﬂow (CFit) in corporations is obtained by adding non-cash cost items, such
as depreciation and amortisation, to income after interest and taxes and before
extraordinary items (net income). In the computation of agricultural cooperative
cash ﬂow, it is not only important to distinguish between cash and non-cash items,
but also to recognise sources and uses of cash that are unique to cooperative organ-
isations. The net income series in the dataset is consistent among pooling and non-
pooling cooperatives as pool distributions are included as an item in ‘cost of goods
sold’ in the computation of pooling cooperatives’ net income. However, the cooper-
ative net income series includes gains or losses on asset sales and sundry after-tax
extraordinary items. Additionally, there are sources of cash ﬂow that are unique to
cooperatives, including cash patronage income, per-unit capital retains and retained
patronage refunds. This study computes cooperative cash ﬂow as the sum of net
income, depreciation and amortisation, but deducts non-cash patronage income,
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patronage dividends paid in cash, net retirements of allocated equity (including reta-
ins revolved), gains or losses on asset sales, and after-tax extraordinary items from
cooperative net income.
In the construction of variables, investment, cash ﬂow, sales and instrumental
variables are ﬁrst deﬂated by the consumer price index (CPI). Subsequently, all vari-
ables are normalised by the ﬁrm’s capital stock in the beginning of the year to elim-
inate scale effects and to lower heteroskedasticity across ﬁrms in the sample.
Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), capital stock is measured as the book value
of property, plant and equipment (i.e. net ﬁxed assets).
Given the order of the VAR and the lags involved in constructing model varia-
bles, the initial 5 years of the panel cannot be used in estimating the investment
model. The investment model is, therefore, estimated for the years between 1996
and 2000. Descriptive statistics for the unbalanced panel of 876 ﬁrms are shown in
Table 1. The average cooperative in the sample has $30 million in assets and sales
of $76 million. It generates $1.8 million in cash ﬂow and invests $1.7 million in
ﬁxed assets per year. In addition, the average cooperative has a debt to equity ratio
of 0.91. However, only 42% of cooperative equity capital is permanent as a high
fraction of total equity is allocated to individual member accounts and is, therefore,
redeemable.
4. Empirical Results
In this section, the empirical results from estimating the Q investment model for the
sample of US agricultural cooperatives are analysed (Table 2). Results are based on
the following instruments: lagged values 2 to 4 of cash ﬂow and sales as well as net
worth, net income and depreciation. In line with theoretical predictions, both margi-
nal q and cash ﬂow are found to positively affect cooperative physical capital
investment. The fact that cooperative investment is signiﬁcantly sensitive to cash
ﬂow – after controlling for investment demand – suggests the presence of binding
ﬁnancial constraints in the full cooperative sample (model 2).
Table 1
Summary statistics for the cooperative sample, 1996–2000 (n ¼ 4216)
Variable Mean
Standard
deviation Maximum
95th
percentile
5th
percentile Minimum
Total assets ($million) 30.05 165.02 2,934.70 66.63 0.98 0.11
Net worth ($million) 12.08 59.17 1,030.40 26.92 0.63 0.03
Capital stock ($million) 9.69 56.79 925.95 21.11 0.18 0.01
Investment ($million) 1.70 12.29 474.78 3.59 )0.01 )14.48
Cash ﬂow ($million) 1.80 10.82 290.89 3.71 0.01 )16.50
Sales ($million) 75.68 497.09 10,830.27 167.51 1.71 0.15
Investment/capital stock 0.21 0.23 1.62 0.69 )0.01 )0.07
Cash ﬂow/capital stock 0.26 0.19 1.50 0.63 0.02 )0.29
Sales/capital stock 10.44 7.30 81.51 22.73 2.44 0.80
Debt to equity ratio 0.91 0.92 10.00 2.45 0.13 0.00
Permanent equity/net worth 0.42 0.29 1.00 0.99 0.00 0.00
Retained earnings/net worth 0.33 0.23 1.00 0.82 0.00 0.00
Z-score 4.97 9.91 45.66 8.82 2.16 0.15
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Model 3 introduces a stock measure of liquidity in the investment model as accu-
mulated liquid resources may provide a ﬁnancial cushion reducing the sensitivity of
investment to cash ﬂow for ﬁrms facing imperfect access to outside capital. Our
measure of liquidity is cash stock, deﬁned as the sum of cash plus securities that are
readily convertible into cash. Cash stock is measured at the beginning of the period
and is also deﬂated by the CPI and normalised by capital stock. The results support
the view that liquidity has a signiﬁcant effect on investment. Even though the cash
ﬂow coefﬁcient is reduced, it is still statistically signiﬁcant.
In order to ascertain whether cooperative structural and ﬁnancial characteristics
affect the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow, interaction terms are added to the
investment model. In this study, we focus on the effects of ﬁrm size, permanent
equity capital, credit risk and leverage on cooperative investment behaviour.
Regarding ﬁrm size, the literature suggests that small ﬁrms are more likely to face
ﬁnancing constraints because they are typically younger, less well known, and hence
more vulnerable to capital market imperfections induced by information asymme-
tries and collateral constraints (Schaller, 1993). This study uses total assets to meas-
ure the size of cooperative ﬁrms. Empirical results suggest that cooperative size
signiﬁcantly affects the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow (model 4). In partic-
ular, the larger the size of the cooperative, the smaller the sensitivity of investment
to cash ﬂow.
Another ﬁnancial characteristic hypothesised to affect cooperative access to exter-
nal sources of capital is the amount of permanent equity capital relative to total net
worth. Permanent equity capital is deﬁned as the sum of common stock, preferred
stock and unallocated retained earnings and is intended to measure the amount of
‘true’ equity capital held by agricultural cooperatives. The rationale for using this
criterion is that cooperatives with relatively high amounts of permanent equity
might have better access to external sources of ﬁnance. The interaction term
between permanent capital (PK) and cash ﬂow suggests that the sensitivity of
Table 2
Cooperative investment model estimates (p-value in parentheses)
Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
Model
6
Model
7
Model
8
Model
9
Fundamental q 0.094 0.046 0.031 0.040 0.056 0.054 0.047 0.039 0.041
(0.001) (0.010) (0.055) (0.051) (0.021) (0.012) (0.009) (0.059) (0.055)
Cash ﬂow – 0.456 0.430 1.174 0.659 0.663 0.439 0.877 0.852
– (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Cash stock – – 0.074 – – – – 0.080 0.080
– – (0.000) – – – – (0.000) (0.000)
Size * cash ﬂow – – – )0.106 – – – )0.066 )0.064
– – – (0.002) – – – (0.050) (0.059)
PK * cash ﬂow – – – – )0.421 – – – –
– – – – (0.273) – – – –
Z-score *
cash ﬂow
– – – – – )0.002 – )0.0002 –
– – – – – (0.000) – (0.294) –
Debt ratio *
cash ﬂow
– – – – – – 0.00002 0.0004 0.0004
– – – – – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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investment to cash ﬂow is negatively correlated with permanent capital but the esti-
mated coefﬁcient is not statistically different from zero (model 5).
In addition to ﬁrm size and permanent equity capital, this study evaluates whe-
ther credit risk (Z-score) of a cooperative affects its investment behaviour. The
Z-score is a measure for predicting bankruptcy that lenders use in conjunction with
other credit scoring techniques to assess the probability that a customer will not
pay (Altman, 1968). The following variables are used to compute the Z-score: work-
ing capital, retained unallocated earnings, before-tax income, total net worth, and
net sales revenue.3 Given the dependence of most agricultural cooperatives on bor-
rowed capital as a source of external funds, the ability to access credit markets dis-
tinguishes ﬁnancially constrained from non-constrained cooperatives. Indeed, the
estimated coefﬁcient for the interaction term suggests a negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant relationship between Z-score and the sensitivity of cooperative investment
to cash ﬂow (model 6). As a cooperative’s bankruptcy risk decreases, it has better
access to borrowed funds thus becoming less dependent on internally generated cap-
ital to invest.
Finally, we also examine whether capital structure affects cooperative investment
behaviour. We expect cooperatives with high debt ratios to be more dependent on
internal funds as a source of investment capital as the cost of borrowed funds
increases with leverage. Results support this prediction showing a positive and signi-
ﬁcant relationship between leverage and the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow
(model 7).
For the current models to be valid in the sense that the estimated marginal effects
of the interaction terms are related to these variables (i.e. no omitted variable bias)
we would have to assume that interaction terms are not correlated with each other.
If they are correlated, one would expect that some of them are not signiﬁcant in
combination, because they might pick up the same underlying characteristic of the
cooperative. Thus the investment model is estimated with all interaction terms sim-
ultaneously (model 8). Results show that ﬁnancial variables (cash ﬂow and cash
stock) play a signiﬁcant role in cooperative investment behaviour after controlling
for marginal q. In addition, the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow is reduced for
large cooperatives but augmented for cooperatives with high ﬁnancial leverage. The
credit risk (Z-score) interaction term, however, loses signiﬁcance possibly because of
its correlation with debt ratio. These results are corroborated in model 9, which
does not include the interaction term for credit risk. We note, however, that the
coefﬁcients of the remaining variables hardly change compared with model 8.
5. Firm Investment Behaviour in the US Food Industry
To verify the robustness of our results we repeat the preceding analysis of cooper-
ative investment behaviour using only ﬁrms in food manufacturing industries. We
collect ﬁnancial data from publicly traded food manufacturing ﬁrms from Standard
3Z-score was calculated by the lender who provided the data using the following formula:
Z-score ¼ 1.2 * [(total current assets ) total current liabilities)/total assets] + 1.4 * (retained
unallocated earnings/total assets) + 3.3 * [(proﬁt before distribution and tax + interest
expense)/total assets] + 0.6 * [(total net worth ) net intangibles goodwill ) net intangibles
other)/total liabilities] + 0.999 * (net sales revenue/total assets).
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and Poor’s Compustat database (www.compustat.com). The unrestricted residual
claim characteristic of common stock is the most effective means of ‘generating
large amounts of wealth from residual claimants on a permanent basis’ in order to
ﬁnance organisation-speciﬁc assets (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 312). It is, therefore,
reasonable to expect that publicly traded ﬁrms be a priori ﬁnancially unconstrained.
Summary statistics for the two food industry sub-samples are shown in Table 3.
The corporations in the sample are larger than the cooperatives in terms of assets,
net worth, capital stock and sales. They also invest relatively more and generate
more cash ﬂows. Regarding capital structure, corporations are on average less lever-
aged than cooperatives. In addition, corporate net worth is permanent whereas
cooperatives rely more heavily on redeemable sources of equity capital. Note that
unallocated retained earnings represent 19% of food industry cooperative total net
worth compared with 75% for their corporate counterparts.
The empirical investment model introduced above is estimated for corporations
and cooperatives separately.4 Regression results for the two relevant coefﬁcients in
the investment equation are shown by sub-sample in Table 4. First, we discuss the
results of the model augmented with the cash ﬂow variable. Both types of ﬁrms
respond positively to marginal q as indicated by the sign of the estimated coefﬁ-
cient. In other words, food industry cooperatives and corporations invest more
when the demand for capital measured by marginal q is larger. The implied adjust-
ment cost parameter is lower for corporations compared with cooperatives, which
suggests that corporations react more quickly with investment to exogenous shocks
than their cooperative counterparts. The p-value of the marginal q estimate for the
cooperative sub-sample is such that a statistical signiﬁcant inﬂuence would be rejec-
ted at the 10% conﬁdence level. Consequently, the data do not show marginal q to
be a strong determinant of investment in the case of cooperatives with operations in
the food industry.
Table 3
Food industry sub-samples: Mean values of variables, 1996–2000
Variable Corporations Cooperatives
Total assets ($million) 2402.92 151.58
Net worth ($million) 766.27 54.64
Capital stock ($million) 788.13 48.43
Investment ($million) 93.15 8.68
Cash ﬂow ($million) 269.85 8.68
Sales ($million) 2935.11 376.01
Investment/capital stock 0.20 0.18
Cash ﬂow/capital stock 0.32 0.22
Sales/capital stock 4.58 11.55
Debt to equity ratio 2.53 3.01
Permanent equity/net worth 1.00 0.28
Retained earnings/net worth 0.75 0.19
Number of observations 435 431
4We performed a Wald test on the H0 hypothesis that all coefﬁcients are equal across
groups. The hypothesis was rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level (p-value ¼ 0.000).
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Cash ﬂow has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on investment for cooperatives beyond the
indirect inﬂuence of marginal q, but this is not the case for corporations. In other
words, the evidence suggests that cooperatives are ﬁnancially constrained, whereas
corporations are not. Therefore, our comparison of the investment behaviour of
cooperatives versus corporations provides further support for the cooperative
capital constraint hypothesis.
Given that the inﬂuence of cash ﬂow is not statistically signiﬁcant for corpora-
tions, we set beta equal to zero and re-estimate the model for corporations (Table 4).
We observe that marginal q is still positive and signiﬁcant but larger than in the
augmented model. Nevertheless, it still implies a quicker reaction of corporations to
changing environments than cooperatives in the relevant augmented model. We also
report the estimate of the marginal q coefﬁcient in the model without cash ﬂow for
cooperatives. The substantially different coefﬁcient would lead the analyst who just
looks at this model to falsely believe that marginal q is a statistically signiﬁcant and
highly relevant determinant of cooperative investment. It is a reminder that the
model with only marginal q is relevant only in the absence of capital constraints.
6. Summary and Conclusions
It is commonly argued in the literature that agricultural cooperatives are ﬁnancially
constrained because they are unable to acquire sufﬁcient risk capital to invest in
productive assets. In this research, we address the issue of capital constraints in
agricultural cooperatives and examine whether physical capital investment is con-
strained by availability of ﬁnance. It is observed that cooperative investment
responds positively and signiﬁcantly to both the marginal proﬁtability of capital
and cash ﬂow. When the cash ﬂow variable is included in the investment equation
with marginal q, there is a positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between
investment and cash ﬂow for the cooperative sample. When focusing on investment
behaviour in the US food industry, results suggest that cash ﬂow plays a signiﬁcant
role in the investment behaviour of cooperatives but not in publicly traded corpora-
tions. In other words, cash ﬂow inﬂuences cooperative investment over and above
its predictive content about the future proﬁtability of capital.
In addition, tests for excess sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow are extended
with the inclusion of interaction terms in the cooperative investment equation. These
interaction terms are added to examine whether cooperative structural and ﬁnancial
variables affect the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow. It is found that size, credit
risk and leverage signiﬁcantly affect cooperative investment behaviour. These results
Table 4
Investment behaviour in the food industry (p-values in
parentheses)
Corporations Cooperatives
Cash ﬂow-augmented model
Fundamental q 0.328 (0.057) 0.668 (0.167)
Cash ﬂow )0.547 (0.483) 0.608 (0.022)
Model without cash ﬂow
Fundamental q 0.454 (0.000) 0.252 (0.092)
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suggest that cooperative managers might be able to alleviate capital constraints by
pursuing growth-related strategies while maintaining a conservative capital structure.
Investment constraints arise in agricultural cooperatives as a result of free rider,
horizon, and portfolio problems. Cooperatives face vaguely deﬁned property rights
constraints because residual claims are restricted to members, non-transferable,
redeemable, and with beneﬁt distribution proportional to patronage rather than
members’ capital contributions. If agricultural cooperatives are to remain viable
organisations in the 21st century, their leaders might need to revisit these restric-
tions on residual claims. This study does not empirically establish that the nature
of cooperative residual claims causes ﬁnancial constraints. Nor does it claim that
eliminating restrictions on residual claims is a sufﬁcient condition for ameliorating
ﬁnancial constraints in cooperatives. However, our empirical results suggest that
eliminating restrictions on residual claims – such as in the corporate ownership
structure – might be a necessary condition for the attenuation of cooperative capital
constraints. Perhaps not surprisingly, cooperatives in advanced agricultural coun-
tries are beginning to adopt organisational structures that relax some restrictions on
traditional cooperative residual claims (Chaddad and Cook, 2004). The survival and
growth of agricultural cooperatives in responding to the challenges brought about
by the industrialisation of agriculture will likely depend on the relative efﬁciency of
such organisational innovations.
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